This study investigates whether analysts strategically construct their portfolios along the supply chain. We document four major findings. First, the likelihood of an analyst following a firm's major customer increases with the strength of the economic tie along the supply chain, as measured by the percent of the firm's sales to its customer. Second, analysts who follow the firms' major customers incorporate the customers' earnings news into their forecast revisions for the (supplier) firms, but other analysts do not. Third, by following the major customer firms, analysts can improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts for the supplier firms. Fourth, the improvement in forecast accuracy attributed to following a firm's customers is statistically as important as the effect of following the firm's industry peers. We obtain these results while controlling for the analysts' endogenous choice of covering a firm's major customers.
Introduction
This study examines equity analysts' decisions to strategically follow the major customers of firms in their research portfolios, analysts' revisions of supplier firms' earnings in response to the earnings news of their customers, and the effect of customer coverage on analysts' forecast accuracy for supplier firms. We document evidence consistent with analysts exploring the economic bonds and information complementarities between supplier and customer firms.
Firms are economically linked to each other in many ways, among which the suppliercustomer link is an important one. The relation between suppliers and customers are explicit and sometimes delineated in contractual arrangements. Firms along the supply chain interact with each other directly through their trading relations, and indirectly through market prices for their inputs and outputs (Menzly and Ozbas 2010) . Furthermore, suppliers and customers might be exposed to similar demand/supply or technological shocks. Given that a significant portion of a firm's revenue and earnings arises from sales to its major customers, the future cash flows and earnings of the firm tend to be positively correlated with those of its major customers. 1 1 In certain cases, the future cash flows and earnings of the firm could be negatively correlated with those of its major customers. For example, the growth and expansion of the major customer firms may increase their bargaining power in setting the prices and other sales terms favorable to themselves. The fact that such a possibility exists biases against obtaining results consistent with our prediction. Because of the strong economic tie existing between suppliers and customers, any value-relevant information about major customers is expected to be value relevant for suppliers as well. Unlike information externalities existing among firms in the same industry, the positive economic links between the suppliers and their customers allow us to better capture the vertical information transfers between the supplier and its customers. Indeed, Olsen and Dietrich (1985) , Cohen and Frazzini (2008a, 2008b) , Hertzel et al. (2008), and Pandit et al. (2010) Given the economic links between the firms along the supply chain, it is surprising that few studies (to the best of our knowledge) have examined (1) whether analysts strategically cover the major customers of their portfolio firms to enhance the quality of their research, (2) whether analysts who follow the customer firms pay more attention to the earnings news of the customers and utilize them more efficiently when revising their forecasts of the suppliers' earnings, (3) whether following the suppliers' customers enhances the analysts' forecast accuracy for the suppliers, and (4) whether the improvement in forecast accuracy from covering the suppliers' customers is economically as important as the improved accuracy from following the suppliers' peers in the same industry.
We examine these questions using a sample of firms with supplier-customer relations over the period from 1982 to 2008. We document four key results. First, we find that the percent of a firm's sales to a customer is positively related to the likelihood of an analyst covering that customer. Second, analysts who follow their portfolio firms' customers incorporate the earnings news of the customers into their revisions of the suppliers' earnings, but other analysts do not. In particular, the probability of the former analysts issuing a forecast revision for the suppliers within 14 days of a customer's earnings news event increases with the absolute magnitude of the news. Moreover, the forecast revisions of the suppliers' earnings are positively associated with the magnitude of the customers' earnings news (as captured by earnings surprises or analyst forecast revisions). Third, our analysis shows that following a firm's customers improves an analyst's relative forecast accuracy, having controlled for other well-known determinants of forecast accuracy. Finally, we show that analyst forecast performance benefits as much from following a firm's major customers as from covering its industry peers.
This study is related to four strands of literature in accounting and finance. First, prior research addresses analysts' portfolio choice from various angles: single industry versus multiindustries (Clement 1999; Kini et al. 2009 ), single country versus multi-countries (Duru and Reeb 2002; Kini et al. 2009 ), and industry specialization versus country specialization (Sonney 2009 ). We add to this line of research by investigating the economic determinants and consequences of analysts' decisions to follow the major customers of the firms in their research portfolios. Our results are consistent with the strength of their economic link being an important consideration for analysts to follow a firm's major customer.
Second, previous studies have documented evidence consistent with the existence of vertical information transfers along the supply chain. Olsen and Dietrich (1985) find that the monthly sales announcements of firms in the retail industry affect the stock prices of their suppliers. Hertzel et al. (2008) document negative stock returns for the suppliers of firms that filed for bankruptcy. Pandit et al. (2010) show that the degree of information transfer along the supply chain is positively related to the economic bond between the supplier and customer, seasonal changes in the customer's revenue and cost of goods sold, and macro economic uncertainty. They further find that the information transfer is due to both changes in the market's expectation of the supplier's future cash flow and changes in market uncertainty. In this study, we investigate analysts' strategic use of the information complementarities between firms along the supply chain. While the aforementioned studies examine investor reactions to the news of a firm's major customers, we focus on the responses of analysts. Hence, we provide evidence for the mechanism by which a customer firm's earnings news is impounded into its suppliers' stock prices.
Furthermore, Cohen and Frazzini (2008a, 2008b) document that suppliers' stock returns are predictable using lagged customer returns and forecast revisions. Shahrur et al. (2009) find similar results using international industry-level data. Finally, Menzly and Ozbas (2010) show that economically linked industries cross-predict each other's returns. In this study, we find that analysts who follow their portfolio firms' customers incorporate the earnings news of the customers into their revisions of the suppliers' earnings, but other analysts do not. Our results suggest that the slow responses to customer news in supplier stock prices could be due to the lack of analysts following of the supplier firms' major customers.
Third, we contribute to the literature on the relation between following firms from different industries and analysts' forecast accuracy. Prior studies argue that analysts face a difficult tradeoff: gain from the additional information spilled over among industries versus loss from spreading their resources too thin. Clement (1999) and Kini et al. (2009) , among others, show that industry-or sector-level diversification decreases forecast accuracy in the U.S. In contrast, our study documents that analysts covering firms from different industries along the supply chain actually exhibit better forecast accuracy, because they can benefit from the information complementarities based on the economic ties between suppliers and customers.
Finally, we shed light on the debate regarding whether analysts' forecasts contain industry-specific or firm-specific information. When firms have strong economic bonds with their customers, we show that analysts strategically follow the customers to collect firm-specific information on the suppliers. We further show that following a firm's customers improves an analyst's forecast accuracy, and that the improvement is as large as that comes from following a firm's peers in the same industry. Hence, this evidence is consistent with analysts incorporating firm-specific information into their earnings forecasts.
Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 examines the economic determinants of analysts' decisions to cover their portfolio firms' major customers. Section 5 investigates analysts' revisions of suppliers' earnings in response to the earnings news of the firms' customers. Section 6 tests the effect of analyst coverage of customer firms on the accuracy of their earnings forecasts for the corresponding supplier firms. Section 7 concludes. 6
Background and Hypotheses

Determinants of an analyst's choice to follow a firm's major customer
Analysts construct their coverage portfolios based upon an evaluation of the costs and benefits of covering a firm. The payoffs for the analysts' coverage come from the sales of their research and the trading commissions that the analysts generate for their brokerage houses (Hayes 1998; Gilson et al. 2001) . Hence, the analysts might strategically construct the portfolio of firms they follow to enhance the quality and investment value of the research they produce.
Prior research shows that analysts tend to specialize in a few industries (e. It is important for analysts to follow firms along a supply chain for at least two reasons.
First, the costs and revenues of the suppliers and customers are closely related. Studying the major customers of a supplier provides the analyst a better understanding of the supplier's profit drivers and helps the analyst to make better predictions of the firm's earnings. Second, firms in the same supply chain are influenced by some common factors, such as price, supply/demand, or technological shocks. Hence, following a firm's customers can benefit the analyst by exploiting the vertical information transfer along the supply chain (Pandit et al. 2010) . The information that the analyst obtains about the customer firms will provide useful indicators for the corresponding suppliers.
We expect the information complementarity to be greater when there are strong economic ties between supplier and customer firms. Indeed, Pandit et al. (2010) document that the information externality increases with the strength of the economic bond between a supplier and its major customer. Hence, the marginal benefit of including a customer in the coverage portfolio increases with the economic importance of the customer to the supplier. When such marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost, analysts choose to include the customers in their research portfolios. This discussion leads to our first testable hypothesis (in alternative form):
H1: Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of an analyst following a firm's major customer is positively correlated with the strength of the economic link between the two firms.
Analyst's revision of supplier's forecast in response to the customer's earnings news
Information spillovers among firms in the same industry have been widely studied.
Foster (1981) and Han and Wild (1990) show that the earnings news of one firm affects the stock prices of other firms in the same industry. Ramnath (2002) finds that the earnings surprises of the first earnings announcers are informative for the earnings news of subsequent announcers in the same industry. However, both analysts and investors underreact to the earnings news of the first announcers. Finally, Thomas and Zhang (2008) document evidence consistent with the late announcers overreacting to the early announcers' earnings news. Olsen and Dietrich (1985) and Pandit et al. (2010) extend the intra-industry information transfer literature by examining information transfers along the supply chain. Specifically, Olsen and Dietrich (1985) find that the monthly sales announcements of firms in the retail industry affect the stock prices of their suppliers and other firms in the supplier's industry. Pandit et al. (2010) show that a firm's stock prices also react to the earnings surprises and analysts' forecast revisions of the firm's major customers. Hertzel et al. (2008) find negative stock returns for the suppliers of firms that filed for bankruptcy. On the other hand, Cohen and Frazzini (2008a, 2008b) and Menzly and Ozbas (2010) In sum, similar to the intra-industry information transfer phenomenon, the earnings news of a customer firm is informative about its suppliers' earnings and, hence, stock prices. Put differently, information spillovers along the supply chain exist, even though investors might be slow in impounding the information into the stock prices of supplier firms.
If analysts strategically cover a firm's major customers, we expect them to pay close attention to the information complementarities between customers and suppliers.
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the analyst's earnings forecast revision of the supplier firm is positively associated with the earnings news of the customer firm.
Analyst's coverage of customer firm and forecast accuracy
Prior studies have provided several determinants of analysts' forecast accuracy, such as a firms' information environment (Brown et al.1987; Kross et al. 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1996) , an analyst's ability and skills (Clement 1999; Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement et al. 2007; Bae et al. 2008) , and an analyst's portfolio choices (Clement 1999; Kini et al. 2009; Sonney 2009 ).
Regarding an analyst's portfolio choices, the prior literature shows that analysts can enjoy economies of scale in information acquisition and production by specializing in one industry (Clement 1999). However, Kini et al. (2009) argue and find that the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is unclear. This is because analysts can also benefit from the information complementarities among firms from different sectors or countries that are exposed to similar risk factors. Hence, the impact of analyst portfolio choice on forecast accuracy is thus a result of the tradeoff between these two competing forces.
Given a strong economic link between customer and supplier firms, an analyst is expected to enjoy an information advantage from covering firms along a supply chain. The information gathered for one firm can have implications for another firm. On the other hand, following a firm's customer may distract an analyst if her coverage portfolio becomes more complex, especially when the customer firm is from a different sector or industry than the supplier. For example, Clement (1999) and Kini et al. (2009) find for U.S. firms a negative relation between analyst forecast accuracy and the number of industries/sectors an analyst follows. If the economic links between customers and suppliers are strong, we expect the information complementarity effect to dominate the loss of scale economies. We thus expect that analysts can improve their forecast accuracy for a firm by following its major customer firm(s).
Formally, we propose the following hypothesis (in alternative form):
H3: Ceteris paribus, following a firm's major customer(s) improves an analyst's forecast accuracy for a supplier firm.
Sample and Data
Our initial sample consists of supplier-customer firm pairs over the period from January 1982 to December 2008. SFAS Nos. 14 and 131 require firms to disclose the identity of any customer representing more than 10% of the firm's total sales. To test hypothesis H1 regarding the analyst's decision to follow the major customer of a firm in her coverage portfolio, we start with a sample of analysts who followed the supplier firm of each supplier-customer pair in each year. Column (3) in table 1 indicates that there are a total
We retrieve the names of the major customers for each firm from the COMPUSTAT industry segment customer file. As in Fee and Thomas (2004), we use the customer name to manually match the customer to a company on the COMPUSTAT Industrial file. If a match is found, we retrieve the corresponding identifiers of 28,239 supplier-customer pairs with at least one analyst covering the supplier firm over the entire sample period. Since some suppliers have multiple customer firms and have more than one analyst following them, we have a large number (260,371) of analyst-supplier-customer-year observations. This is the sample we use to test hypothesis H1 (the actual number of observations used is lower because of missing data for some of the control variables).
The examination of hypothesis H2 starts with the sample used to test hypothesis H1.
From within this sample, we include all observations with an earnings news event from the customer firm. Earnings news events include earnings (quarterly or annual) announcements and releases of analysts' earnings forecasts.
To test hypothesis H3 regarding the impact of following a firm's customer on the analyst's forecast accuracy for the supplier firm, we use all analyst-supplier-year observations with at least two I/B/E/S analysts covering the supplier firm. Table 1 , column (5) shows that number of analyst-supplier-year observations is 161,345 over the sample period. The numbers reported under column (5) are lower than those reported under column (4), because some suppliers have more than one major customer. The actual number of observations used in testing hypothesis H2 is reduced due to missing data for some of the control variables and the restriction that at least two analysts cover the supplier firm.
We retrieve financial statement data from COMPUSTAT, stock information (stock prices, the number of shares outstanding, and trading volume) from the CRSP monthly database, and analyst earnings forecasts and actual earnings data from the I/B/E/S Detail History database.
The construction of all the regression variables are described in the subsequent sections and summarized in an appendix.
Analyst's Propensity to Cover a Firm's Major Customer
Research design
We use the following logistic regression model to investigate the economic determinants of an analyst's decision to follow a firm's major customer (hypothesis H1): (1) where the dependent variable, Follow_C ijkt is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if analyst i who follows firm j also covers firm j's major customer k in year t, and zero otherwise.
We estimate equation (1) using a sample of I/B/E/S analysts who cover the supplier firms in all the supplier-customer firm pairs. Hence, the unit of analysis is the analyst-supplier-customeryear.
As stated in H1, we expect that the likelihood of an analyst covering a firm's customer increases with the importance of that customer. We use C_Sales jkt as a proxy for the importance of the economic link between the firm and its customer firm k, where C_Sales jkt is defined as the percentage of firm j's sales to its customer k in year t. H1 predicts that the more important is customer k, the more likely that the analyst will strategically choose to cover firm k. Therefore, we expect the estimated coefficient on C_Sales jkt to be positive.
If an analyst has already followed a firm's customer last year, it is more likely that she will continue covering it this year. We control for Lag_Follow_C ijkt , which is the lag of Follow_C ijkt , to take into account the serial correlation in analyst coverage. We expect a positive coefficient on Lag_Follow_C ijkt .
We include a number of variables to control for the potential impact of the customer firm's characteristics on the analyst's likelihood of covering that firm. Ln_C_MV jkt is the natural logarithm of the equity market capitalization of firm j's customer firm k in year t at year-end.
Firm size can influence both the demand for and supply of analyst services (Bhushan 1989) . The demand for analyst services increases with the size of the firm and, hence, an analyst is more likely to follow large firms. Firm size also affects the cost of acquiring information. On the one hand, large firms are likely to have more complex business structures or operations, making them more costly for the analyst to cover. On the other hand, large firms usually provide more public disclosure and thus lead to less costly information acquisition. Therefore, it is unclear how the size of the customer firm would affect the likelihood that the analyst will cover it. C_Volume jkt is the annual trading volume of firm j's customer k in year t. The analyst is more likely to follow stocks with high trading volume, because they help sell her research and generate trading commissions for her brokerage house. C_Leverage jkt is the leverage of firm j's customer k in year t, defined as k's total liabilities divided by the market value of equity. High leverage firms may have a greater demand to access the equity markets, thus generating greater need for analyst following. C_in_CoreInd ijkt takes a value of one if firm j's customer k belongs to analyst i's core industry in year t. If customer k is in the core industry of the analyst, the marginal cost to the analyst of covering it will be relatively low. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient on C_in_CoreInd ijkt . We define an analyst's core industry as the one that the majority of the companies covered by the analyst come from; industry membership is defined in I/B/E/S. N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_C ijkt is the number of analysts other than analyst i that follows firm j's customer k in year t. If there are other analysts following customer firm k, it will be less costly for analyst i to follow it too, but there could also be less need for her to cover it, given that she can use the publicly available research on firm k. Hence, we do not predict the sign of the coefficient on N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_C ijkt .
We also include several variables to control for the characteristics of supplier firm j.
Ln_Firm_MV jt is the market value of firm j, measured as the natural logarithm of the equity market capitalization of the firm in year t. The impact of firm j's size is unclear. On the one hand, the bigger firm j is, the greater the marginal benefit (because of trading commission revenue) for the analyst to enhance her research by covering its major customers. On the other hand, large supplier firms tend to have rich information environments, making it less important for the analyst to search for more information on their customers. Hence, we do not predict the effect of Ln_Firm_MV jt ex ante. N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_Firm ijt refers to the number of analysts other than analyst i who follow supplier firm j in year t. The greater the number of analysts following supplier j, the higher the competition. As a result, it is more likely that an analyst who is covering firm j's customers will have a competitive advantage over other analysts following the same firm.
Last, we control for analyst characteristics that have been shown to affect portfolio choices (Kini et al. 2009 ). Gen_Exp it is analyst i's general forecasting experience, measured by the number of years since she issued her first earnings forecast according to I/B/E/S in year t. We expect that a more experienced analyst is more likely to cover customer firms, since she might have been exposed to firms in related industries and have experience over her career exploring outside her core industry. Firm_Exp ijt represents the analyst's specific experience in following supplier firm j, measured by the number of years for which she has issued an earnings forecast for firm j in year t. We expect Firm_Exp ijt to have a positive effect on the likelihood that the customer firm will also be followed, because the longer the analyst has followed the supplier firm, the more likely that the analyst knows about the firm's major customers. Num_Firm it is the number of companies in the analyst's portfolio. The larger the analyst's portfolio, the less time she has to cover an additional company. Broker_Size it is the number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm that analyst i works for in year t. The bigger the brokerage firm, the more resources the analyst has to conduct her research. Following the customer firm is a way for her to enhance her research on the supplier firm. Broker_Follow_C ijkt is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one other analyst working in the same brokerage house as analyst i follows customer firm k in year t, and zero otherwise. If another analyst in the same brokerage firm is already covering customer firm k, analyst i can easily get the relevant information on firm k from her peer. Meanwhile, it is not likely that a brokerage house will assign more than one analyst to cover the same firm. Hence, we expect the estimated coefficient on Broker_Follow_C ijkt to be negative. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables employed in analyzing the determinants of an analyst's coverage of a firm's customers (hypothesis H1). The descriptive statistics are provided for the overall sample, subsample Follow_C=0, which is analysts that do not follow customer firms, and subsample Follow_C=1, which are analysts that follow a firm's customer in a supplier-customer pair in a particular year. There are a total of 182,176 useable analyst-supplier-customer-year observations over the period 1982-2008, 155,698 with Follow_C=0 and 26,478 with Follow_C=1. In other words, 14.5% of the total observations have an analyst following both the supplier and customer firms.
Empirical results for analysts' propensity to follow a firm's major customer
As shown in the table, mean C_Sales is slightly larger in the Follow_C=1 subsample than in the Follow_C=0 subsample (17.5% versus 16.7%, t-stat = -9.39). The customer firms in these two subsamples are similar in size, Ln_C_MV, trading volume, C_Volume, and leverage, C_Leverage. However, compared with the Follow_C=0 subsample, the customer firms in the Follow_C=1 subsample are more likely to be in the core industry of the analyst, C_in_CoreInd, and have more analysts following them, N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_C. Moreover, the supplier firms in the Follow_C=1 subsample are larger and have more analysts following them than their counterparts in the Follow_C=0 subsample. Finally, the analysts in the Follow_C=1 sample have more general and specific experiences, cover more companies, and are from smaller brokerage houses than the analysts in the Follow_C=0 sample. Untabulated findings show that C_Sales is significantly correlated with many of these explanatory variables, suggesting that controlling for these other factors in the regression is important to disentangle the incremental effect of C_Sales. Table 3 presents the logistic regression results for the analysis of the determinants of an analyst's decision to follow a firm's major customer. Since the unit of analysis is the analystsupplier-customer-year, we cluster the standard errors by analyst and year. Our main variable of interest is C_Sales. Consistent with our prediction, columns (3) shows that the estimated coefficients on C_Sales is statistically positive, indicating that the stronger the economic link between the supplier and the customer, the more likely that the analyst will include the customer firm in her portfolio. The specification reported under column (4) The result for C_Sales is obtained after controlling for various well-known determinants of analyst coverage. The highly significant coefficient on Lag_Follow_C is consistent with the fact that an analyst is likely to continue covering the firms that are already in her portfolio. The negative coefficient on Ln_C_MV suggests that the analyst is less likely to cover large customer firms, suggesting that it is more costly (or the net benefit is lower) to do so.
The trading volume and leverage (C_Volume and C_Leverage) of the customer exhibit an insignificant impact on the analysts' propensity to cover the customer firm. The estimated coefficient on C_in_CoreInd is statistically positive, consistent with the lower marginal cost of covering the customer firm in the analyst's core industry. Finally, the positive coefficient on N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_C suggests that the more other analysts follow the customer firm, the more likely it is that the analyst will also cover the customer firm.
We find that the characteristics of the supplier firm also affect the analyst's decision whether or not to cover its major customer. In particular, we document a significantly positive coefficient on Ln_Firm_MV, consistent with the analyst being more likely to follow the major customer of large firm. As indicated by the negative coefficient on N_otherAnalyst_Follow_Firm, the analyst is less likely to cover the customer of a supplier firm that has a large analyst coverage.
This result is inconsistent with this variable capturing the competitive reason for the analyst to also follow the customer firm.
Regarding the effect of analyst characteristics on the decision to cover a firm's major customer, the results show that the analyst with more general experience is more likely to cover the customer firm, as shown by the positive coefficient on Gen_Exp. Probably the experienced analyst has previous exposure to the customer firm or the related industry, making the marginal cost of following the customer firm low. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient on Firm_Exp is statistically negative, indicating that the longer the analyst has followed a firm, the less likely she will include its major customer in her portfolio. This result is opposite to what we predicted. We find a statistically positive coefficient on Broker_Size, suggesting that an analyst from a larger brokerage firm has better resources to conduct thorough research on the firms she covers, and can more easily include the firms' major customers in her portfolio. As expected, the estimated coefficient on Broker_Follow_C is significantly negative. In other words, when there are other analysts in the same brokerage firm following the customer firm, the analyst is less likely to cover it herself, probably because she can obtain private information about the customer firm from her colleagues directly. In general, these findings are consistent with those documented in Kini et al. (2009) .
Analysts' Forecast Revisions in Response to the Earnings News of Customer Firms
Research design
The results documented in section 4 are consistent with analysts strategically covering the major customers of the firms in their coverage portfolios. To obtain further direct evidence showing that analysts utilize information about the major customers to enhance their forecast performance for the supplier firms, we investigate whether analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to the customer's earnings news (hypotheses H2a and H2b). We expect analysts who cover the customer firm to use the customer earnings news to a greater extent than those who do not when updating their earnings forecasts.
First, we use the following logistic regression model to test the propensity of an analyst to revise her earnings forecast for the supplier firm in response to the earnings news of the customer firm (hypothesis H2a):
where Dum_Rev ijkt is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if analyst i revises her forecast of supplier j's one-year ahead annual earnings within 14 days after an earnings news event for j's customer k in time t, and zero otherwise. C_News kt is the earnings news of customer k (either the earnings surprise or forecast revision), scaled by firm j's beginning stock price. ES jt is the earnings surprise of the supplier firm j at its most recent earnings announcement, computed using consensus forecast and scaled by the beginning stock price. Abs( . ) is the absolute value operator. We expect that the bigger the customer firm's earnings news (in either direction), the higher the probability that the analyst will issue an earnings forecast revision for the supplier.
Second, conditional on analyst i making a forecast revision for supplier j, we examine the extent to which she revises her earnings forecast in response to the earnings event of customer k (hypothesis H2b). The regression model is specified as follows:
where REV ijt is analyst i's revision of supplier j's earnings within 14 days after an earnings news event for j's customer k in time t. It is calculated as the difference between analyst i's revised and prior forecasts of supplier j's one-year ahead annual earnings, scaled by the stock price of firm j a day before the issuance of analyst i's prior forecast. C_News kt and ES jt are defined as above.
Given the economic link along the supply chain, we expect a positive coefficient on C_News kt if analyst i rationally uses the earnings news of the customer firm k to update her earnings forecasts of the supplier firm j. We expect the coefficient on ES jt to be positive; i.e., analysts use the earnings news released by a firm to update their forecasts for the firm.
Since the sample used in this analysis is conditional on those observations with analyst forecast revisions for the supplier firms, we use Heckman's (1979) two-stage procedure to estimate equation (3). The first stage of the procedure is the probit regression in equation (2). In the second stage, the Inverse Mill's ratio, computed from the probit estimates, is included in equation (3).
Empirical findings
Analysts' responses to information in customers' earnings announcements
In this subsection, we examine analysts' responses to customers' earnings news as captured by the surprises in the customers' earnings announcements (CES). This finding is consistent with analysts who do not cover their portfolio firms' major customers ignoring the earnings news of the customers when making their forecast revision decisions.
4 Table 5 examines the extent to which analysts revise their forecasts for suppliers in response to the earnings releases of customer firms, with a sample of 99,366 observations in which analysts revised their forecasts of the supplier firms within 14 days after the customers'
earnings announcements. Panel A shows that the two subsamples are very similar. In particular, mean REV, CES, and ES are, respectively, -0.006, 0.000, and -0.001 for both subsamples.
Finally, we test whether the analysts from the two subsamples react differently to Abs(CES kt ) by estimating the regression equation on the full sample. The statistically positive coefficient on the interaction term, Abs(CES)×Follow_C , indicates that analysts following the supplier-customer firm pair pay significantly more attention to the earnings news of the customer when making their forecast revision decisions for the supplier than do analysts who do not follow the customers.
Panel B of table 5 reports the estimation results of equation (3). In the Follow_C=1
subsample, both CES and ES are significantly positively associated with REV. Hence, analysts who cover both firms along the supply chain take into consideration the earnings news of the customer firms, when revising their forecasts for the suppliers. The same is not true in the Follow_C=0 subsample, however. The estimated coefficient on CES is not distinguishable from zero, implying that analysts who do not cover their firms' major customers ignore the earnings news of the customers when revising their forecasts of the suppliers' earnings. Finally, when we estimate the regression using the full sample, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term, CES×Follow_C, is statistically positive, with a t-statistic of 2.18. Hence, this evidence is consistent with analysts who follow the customer firm using the information in an earnings surprise of the customer to a greater extent than other analysts when revising her forecast of the supplier firm's earnings.
Analysts' responses to the information in customers' forecast revisions
This subsection investigates analysts' revisions of suppliers' earnings forecasts in response to the revisions of customers' earnings forecasts (CREV). In the Follow_C=1 subsample, CREV is analyst i's revision of customer k's one-year-ahead annual earnings forecast.
In the Follow_C=0 subsample, CREV is the largest revision of customer k's one-year-ahead annual earnings forecast issued by any of the analysts covering customer k. However, analysts who do not cover the customer firms appear to ignore the earnings information of the customers when revising their forecasts for the suppliers' earnings. These results are obtained after controlling for the suppliers' most recent earnings surprises, which are shown to be positively associated with REV as expected.
Effect of Following Customer Firms on Analyst Forecast Accuracy for Supplier Firms
Research design
We use the following multiple regression to test hypothesis H3 that an analyst's covering of a supplier firm's major customers increases her forecast accuracy for the supplier firm: 
where Rank ijt is analyst i's forecast accuracy rank for company j in year t, and
NumberFollowing jt is the number of analysts following company j in year t. Forecast accuracy for Rank ijt is computed as the absolute value of firm j's actual earnings per share in year t minus the most recent earnings per share forecast issued by analyst i at least one month prior to the end of fiscal year t. By construction, Accu_Score ijt controls for cross-sectional differences across companies. We estimate equation (4) using the ordinary least squares method on a sample of I/B/E/S analysts who cover the supplier firms. Hence, the unit of analysis is the analyst-supplieryear.
Our main variable of interest is Dum_Follow_C ijt , an indicator variable equal to one if
analyst i covers at least one customer of firm j in year t, and zero otherwise. We conjecture that following a firm's major customer allows the analyst to obtain additional valuable information about the firm's future profitability and improve her forecast accuracy (hypothesis H3). We thus expect a positive coefficient on Dum_Follow_C.
Since there would be information sharing among analysts working in the same brokerage firm, the analyst may have advance access to useful information about the customer firm if one of her colleagues follows the customer firm. Therefore, we include Broker_Follow_C ijt , which takes the value of one if analyst i's peer at the brokerage firm follows at least one of firm j's customer firms in year t, and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient on
Broker_Follow_C ijt is expected to be positive. We also conjecture that if the customer firm is in the core industry of analyst i, the analyst may acquire relevant information on the customer firm at a lower cost. least one other firm in supplier j's industry in year t; zero otherwise. We expect a positive coefficient on Follow_Ind, as it is more efficient for the analyst to follow more than one firm in the same industry. Num_Ind it is the number of industries followed by analyst i in year t. We expect a negative coefficient on Num_Ind, because sector diversification has shown to reduce forecast accuracy.
5
5 Clement (1999) shows that industry specialization improves analysts' forecast accuracy. Although Kini et al. (2009) argue that the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is context-specific, they document a negative relation for a sample of U.S. firms.
Days_Elap ijt is the length of time in days between the fiscal year t earnings forecast for firm j by analyst i and the previous forecast of firm j's year t earnings issued by any analyst. This variable measures the tendency of earnings forecasts to cluster, and controls for the release date of relevant information. For_Hor ijt is the number of days between the date on which analyst i issues earnings forecast for year t's earnings and the fiscal year end date. It is used to capture the age of analyst i's outstanding forecast. For_Freq ijt is the number of times analyst i issues forecasts for firm j during year t. It is used to control for analyst's effort. Since prior studies (e.g., Clement 1999) show that more experienced analysts provide more accurate forecasts, we include both the analyst's firm-specific (Firm_Exp ijt ) and general forecasting experience (Gen_Exp it ) in the model. We also control for the size of the brokerage firm (Broker_size it ) that the analyst works for, since resources available to the analyst vary with the size of the brokerage firm. To control for the effort an analyst can expend on covering the stocks in her portfolio, we include the number of firms covered by the analyst (Num_Firm it ). Lastly, we control for the firm size (Ln_Firm_MV jt ) in our regression.
Empirical findings on analyst forecast accuracy
In suggesting that those analysts who also follow the customer firms update their earnings forecasts for the supplier firms less frequently; these are unexpected results. Table 9 reports the OLS regression results in column (1). Consistent with our prediction, the estimated coefficient on Dum_Follow_C is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 3.25. This indicates that an analyst can improve forecast accuracy for a particular firm by following its major customers. The positive coefficient on Broker_Follow_C also confirms our conjecture that the analyst may also obtain valuable information on the customer from colleagues working in the same brokerage house, improving her forecast accuracy for the supplier firm accordingly. The coefficient on C_in_CoreInd is negative but indistinguishable from zero. Consistent with industry specialization improving forecast accuracy, we document a positive and significant coefficient on Follow_Ind and a significantly negative coefficient on Num_Ind.
The results on the other control variables are mostly consistent with those documented in prior studies. In particular, the estimated coefficient on Days_Elap is negative and significant, suggesting that forecasts clustered together tend to be more accurate (Clement and Tse 2005).
Similar to O'Brien (1988), we observe a negative coefficient on For_Hor, which indicates that earnings forecasts issued closer to the fiscal year end are more accurate as more information becomes available. As a proxy for analyst's effort, For_Freq receives a positive coefficient, consistent with the previous finding that analysts who expend greater effort in following a firm issue more accurate forecasts (Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999) . Prior literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of analyst general-and firm-specific experience on forecast accuracy (Clement 1999; Brown 2001; Clement and Tse 2005; Kini et al. 2009) . Surprisingly, we document a negative coefficient on Firm_Exp, suggesting that analyst firm-specific forecasting experience reduces her forecast accuracy. On the other hand, the amount of time an analyst has spent in the profession seems to improve her forecast accuracy, as manifested by the positive and significant coefficient on Gen_Exp. In contrast to our initial prediction and prior studies, the estimated coefficient on Broker_Size is negative although statistically insignificant. The main difference between our test and the others is that we control for Broker_Follow_C in the regression. We thus speculate that the main information advantage of working for larger brokerage firms is the access to the information on customer firms. The negative coefficient on
Num_Firm is consistent with analyst forecast accuracy decreasing with portfolio size (Clement 1999). Last, we find a positive coefficient on ln_Firm_MV, suggesting that forecast accuracy is greater for larger firms in general.
It has been shown in prior studies that industry specialization enhances forecast accuracy, because firms within an industry are subject to many common economic forces. We document here that the economic link along the supply chain also exposes supplier and customer firms to common shocks. We compare the relative importance of these two economic links by testing the equality of the estimated coefficients on Follow_Ind and Dum_Follow_C using an Ftest. The result, reported in the last row of table 9, shows that the two estimated coefficients are not significantly different from each other at the 10% level. In other words, information transfer along the supply chain and intra-industry information transfer have a similar effects on analysts' forecast accuracy.
Because the individual analyst or her brokerage house decides whether or not to follow a firm's major customer, our tests might be subject to self-selection bias. To correct for this potential bias, we apply the Heckman's (1979) two-stage procedure to equation (4). In the first stage, we estimate a probit model similar to the one specified in equation (1). We use analystsupplier-year observations in this analysis. Hence, if a supplier has more than one major customer, we use the largest customer of the supplier to measure the explanatory variables. The estimation results are stronger than those reported in table 3 and, hence, not tabulated. In the second stage of the Heckman's (1979) procedure, we include into equation (4) We further expand our multiple regression model specified in equation (4) (4) respectively. The estimated coefficient on FD is negative and statistically significant; suggesting that overall there is a decrease in analyst forecast accuracy in the post-Reg FD period.
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term FD t × Dum_Follow_C ijt is negative, but indistinguishable from zero. We thus find little evidence that the improvement in analyst forecast accuracy of the supplier firm from covering the customer firm changes significantly in the post-Reg FD period.
Conclusion
This paper examines analysts' portfolio choices along the supply chain. We show that some analysts choose to construct their portfolios along the supply chain, i.e., following both customers and suppliers. Because of the vertical information transfer between customers and suppliers, the more trades between the supplier and customer, the more important they are to each other, and the more information they can provide for each other. Therefore, we find that analysts tend to cover a firm's customers if the firm's sales to that customer account for high percentage of its total sales. Further analyses show that following firms along the supply chain allows the analysts to pay more attention to the earnings news of the customer firms, as well as to utilize such news more efficiently to revise their forecasts of the supplier's earnings. Analysts indeed benefit from the information complementaries between the supplier and customer. In 
C_Sales jkt
The percentage of firm j's sales to its customer k. It equals firm j's sales to its customer k divided by the firm's total sales in year t.
Ln_C_MV jkt
The natural logarithm of the year-end equity market capitalization of firm j's customer k in year t.
C_Leverage jkt
The debt-to-equity ratio of firm j's customer k.
C_Vol jkt
The annual trading volume of firm j's customer k.
C_in_CoreInd ijkt
An indicator variable takes the value of 1 if firm j's customer k is in analyst i's core industry.
N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_C ijkt
The number of analysts other than analyst i following firm j's customer k.
Ln_Firm_MV jt
The natural logarithm of the average equity market capitalization of firm j in year t. This variable is a proxy for the firm's information environment.
N_OtherAnalyst_Follow_Firm ijt The number of analysts other than analyst i following firm j in year t.
Gen_Exp it
The number of years (starting from the first year on I/B/E/S and including the current fiscal year t) for which analyst i has earnings forecasts on I/B/E/S. It measures an analyst's general experience.
Firm_Exp ijt
The number of years for which an analyst i has issued an earnings forecast for firm j in the I/B/E/S database. This variable is a proxy for the analyst's familiarity with the firm.
Num_Firm it
The number of firms covered by analyst i.
Broker_Size it
The number of analysts employed in analyst i's brokerage firm.
Broker_Follow_C ijkt
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if other analysts in analyst i's brokerage house follow firm j's customer k in year t.
Variables used in testing hypothesis H2 (see section 5) Dum_REV ijkt
An indicator that takes a value of one if analyst i revises her forecast of supplier j's one-year-ahead annual earnings within 14 days after firm j's customer k releases earnings in time t, and zero otherwise.
REV ijt
The difference between analyst i's revised and prior forecasts on supplier j's one-year-ahead annual earnings, scaled by the stock price of firm j the day before the issuance of analyst i's prior forecast.
CES kt
Earnings surprise of customer firm k at its most recent earnings announcement, computed using consensus forecast and scaled by the beginning stock price.
CREV kt
In the Follow_C=1 subsample, CREV is an analyst's own forecast revision for customer k's one-year-ahead annual earnings. In the Follow_C=0 subsample, CREV is the largest forecast revision of customer k's one-year ahead annual earnings issued by any of the analysts covering firm k.
ES jt
Earnings surprise of the supplier firm j at its most recent earnings announcement, computed using consensus forecast and scaled by the beginning stock price.
(continued…) 
